Is Estonia the Next Ukraine?

Last week Russian security forces abducted an Estonian security officer along the country’s border with Russia. The incident is a serious development, but is also merely one of several that have analysts looking at Estonia as the possible next theatre for Russian ambitions.

Russia and Estonia have never enjoyed a particularly smooth relationship, thanks in part to different interpretations of Soviet and Russian actions and Estonian independence. Estonia declared independence in 1918 and enjoyed recognized independence until the outbreak of World War II when Germany and the Soviet Union made a deal that granted the Soviets control over the Baltic states, including Estonia. Faced with overwhelming slaughter following a complete military blockade by Soviet forces, the Estonian government capitulated to Soviet rule, only to then be taken over by Germany. Soviet forces again occupied Estonia after defeating German forces in 1944, an event celebrated in Russian history. Russia continues to see this annexation as a liberation, while Estonia views it as an occupation. This fundamental divide explains why Estonia was so quick to reassert their independence as the Soviet Union faced increasing internal turmoil, but also why Russia does not understand Estonia’s reticence towards them. It has also left complicated legal consequences regarding citizenship and rights for the country’s ethnic Russian minority.

Since Estonia reasserted its independence in 1991, most of its ethnic Russian minority has been left in limbo. Since most ethnic Russians are the consequence of the Soviet occupation, Estonia did not recognize them as native citizens in 1991 despite the fact they compromised roughly a third of the country’s population. Naturalization rules required non-citizens to have a basic knowledge of the Estonian language, something that many ethnic Russians did not have. As a result, many ethnic Russians were left stateless. Outreach programs have reduced Estonia’s stateless population from 32% in 1992 to 6.5% in 2014, but at the same time nearly 7% of Estonian residents have now acquired Russian citizenship according to the Estonia’s Ministry of the Interior. Even though Estonia is one of the least populated EU states, it also holds one of the highest percentages of non-nationals as permanent residents. As the Estonian government continues to advance Estonian language, culture and historical narrative, many ethnic Russians feel neglected by the country they have called home for three generations.

This feeling of neglect extends beyond nationality and language. While Estonia has prospered economically since reasserting its independence in 1991 – joining both the EU and NATO – many ethnic Russians remain economically marginalized and face limited opportunities without knowing the Estonian language. More than 20 years after the country broke away from the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians are increasingly looking towards Moscow for political direction, a role that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been more than happy to fill as part of his program of rehabilitating Soviet history and symbols to invoke the grandeur of Russian empire.

Despite all this so far things have been relatively calm in Estonia. But an incident in 2007 regarding the removal of a statute commemorating World War II Soviet war dead in the Estonian capital of Tallinn created a major diplomatic incident that highlights the political instability possible due to these divisions. Ultimately ethnic Russians rioted for several days in Tallinn while pro-Kremlin youth placed the Estonian embassy in Moscow under siege, all with the tacit approval of the Russian government, until international pressure forced officials to reign in the youths. The entire incident only lasted about a week but underscores the very real fissures that lay under the surface and the possible powder keg that may be there. It also demonstrates the very real influence Moscow can have in causing unrest if it chooses.

That influence is already on full display in Eastern Ukraine, and already played out in numerous breakaway regions in Georgia and Moldova. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in March, comments by Russian diplomats regarding the treatment of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states – and in Estonia in particular – have placed relations at an even further low than before. All three Baltic states are members of NATO and the EU, leading many to believe that Russia may increase its rhetoric but will stop short of actual engagement as seen in Ukraine. But the forcible abduction of an Estonian official, just days after President Obama gave a speech in Tallinn confirming that NATO would defend the Baltic states in the face of any Russian aggression, puts that analysis in doubt.

Now analysts are having to contend with a real possibility that the Baltic states will be the next of Putin’s foreign adventures. If so, despite their small size, it will have far wider consequences than the current conflict in Ukraine. With their NATO membership, any attack on Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania will inevitably lead to a much wider conflict between the West and Russia, the type that can reshape Eastern Europe as we know it today.

Originally appeared on UN Dispatch

How Conflict in Ukraine Could Shake Global Food Prices

As the conflict in Eastern Ukraine drags on, Russia and the West are also continuing their diplomatic back-and-forth with each accusing the other of unwarranted interference in Ukrainian matters and aggression towards the opposing side. Following a series of sanctions against Russia by the US and the EU, Russia fired back earlier this month with an extensive list of sanctions against the US and the EU, mainly focused around agriculture and food products. But the size of the agricultural trade at the heart of these sanctions means that this tit-for-tat may wind up having global ramifications.

Starting in March following the unrecognized pro-Russian referendum in Crimea, the US, EU, Australia and Canada levied travel restrictions for key Russian officials and business people, which were expanded in the second round of sanctions announced in April. As the conflict escalated between pro-Russian rebels and the Ukrainian government in the east, new sanctions were announced by the US, EU, Canada and Norway in July and August targeting the Russian financial and energy sectors while Switzerland and Japan announced new travel restrictions.

In response, Russia issued their own travel bans against high ranking Western officials in March but the biggest blow came earlier this month when it announced a one year ban on the import of most agricultural products from the US, EU, Canada, Australia and Norway in retaliation.

While there is significant trade between Russia and the US, Canada, Australia and Norway, it is the EU that is poised to bear the brunt of these sanctions. Russia represents the EU’s second largest food export market at nearly $16 billion a year, a full 10% of the EU market. This means two things: Russia must now find a way to fill the gap on their own shop shelves while producers in the EU must find a way to keep producers afloat as they lose one of their biggest markets.

For Russia, this means finding new trading partners and improving accounts with existing partners not on the sanctions list. While domestic farmers constitute a significant minority of the Russian population and President Putin’s base, it is unlikely they will be able to fill the gap especially in major cities where 60% of food is imported.  Belarus, Turkey and Brazil are already major partners and could benefit enormously from a trade boom but are also facing increasing pressure from the EU to not ramp up exports to Russia in wake of the sanctions as it would undermine the intention of leveraging diplomatic pressure in Ukraine. Such pressure is limited to diplomatic urging but depending on how long the sanction battles last, could easily develop into more robust efforts to stop agricultural trade from key partners who also have significant trade relations with the EU.

The long term impact on the EU is unclear, with growth forecasts downgraded but the emergency funds issued to producers representing a much smaller number than anticipated. In the immediate future producers are left struggling to find something to do with their produce. The current surplus helps European food banks and may drop food prices locally but could serve as yet another setback for economic recovery in countries such as Greece and Spain which have little margin to absorb more austerity measures. Increasing exports to other trading partners is not particularly feasible for the current summer harvest and only time will tell if the EU can successfully adjust in future months through new trading deals and increased domestic consumption. Encouraging local sales will help European producers but may hurt current agricultural exporters outside the continent. It appears that incentives will also be given to farmers to curtail production as a means of stabilizing food prices for member states.

Thus while this may be a diplomatic battle between the EU and Russia, it will likely have far-reaching trade consequences for states in Latin America, Africa and Asia. It also comes at a time when several African countries are facing potential food shortages due to conflict, the current Ebola outbreak and drought in the Sahel. These shortages are typically due to lack of funding and the disruption of supply chains but the sanctions game Russia and the EU are playing may wind up disruption the global agricultural market even more at a time when millions are already vulnerable. One thing is for sure: the aftermath of these August announcements will affect countries far beyond Ukraine for some time to come; what happens next depends on whether cooler heads prevail or if the sanctions continues to escalate into a war of attrition.

Originally posted at UN Dispatch

The 5 Territories that Russia Could Annex Next

Following the recent referendum in Crimea and the growing tensions between the West and Russia over the latter’s military actions in Ukraine, many analysts are looking at what the secession may mean, not just for Ukraine but the region as a whole. One major question is whether Russia will stop at Crimea when it comes to welcoming former regions of the Soviet Union back into the fold. Russia’s past involvement in the region’s various secessionist movements may be helpful in understanding what could happen next, as well as highlight how recent developments reflect unfinished business from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Graphic courtesy of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Eastern Ukraine – Now that Crimea voted to join Russia, many analysts worry that the provinces of Eastern Ukraine with their significant ethnic Russian populations may be next. Like Crimea, most of the population of Eastern Ukraine reject the Euromaidan uprising that deposed President Viktor Yanukovych and favor closer ties with Russia over association with the EU. Recent attempts by the Ukrainian parliament to abolish the option of official regional languages for areas of the country with strong ethnic minorities, although ultimately vetoed by acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, spurred fears of ethnic Russians of oppression as Ukraine moves to the West. Local pro-Russian militias have already clashed with pro-Kiev groups in the eastern city of Donetsk, killing one and injuring dozens. The new government in Kiev seems at a loss about what to do as Russia adds fuel to the fire by mobilizing tank and artillery units along the border. As Ukraine prepares for new elections in May, Eastern Ukraine remains a potential hotspot for a far more volatile political conflict that could rip Ukraine apart.

Transnistria (Moldova) – Bordering Ukraine, this region of Moldova never wanted to leave the Soviet Union and suffered from rising ethnic tensions even before the USSR dissolved in 1991. Because of growing pro-Romanian nationalism in the rest of Moldova, Transnistria declared independence in 1990. As the USSR finally fell apart Transnistria became part of an independent Moldova and within months, open conflict broke out between Transnistria and the Moldovan government.

By July 1992, both sides agreed to a ceasefire and autonomous status for the region that has held to this day but also places Transnistria in limbo. Sporadic international negotiations over the last 15 years has resulted in no lasting agreement on the official rights or status of the region. A 2006 referendum received 97% vote in favor of joining with Russia, but the referendum is not recognized by the international community and has so far mainly been ignore by Russia. However, following recent events in Crimea, lawmakers in Transnistria are once again asking for accession.

Gagauzia (Moldova) – Like Transnistria, Gagauzia hold autonomous status within Moldova and shares a similar history in the wake of the breakup of the USSR. A regional referendum in 1991 heavily favored staying within the USSR, mainly due to concerns over the pro-Romanian nationalist movement. While Gagauzia unilaterally declared independence in August 1991, half of the representatives from the region still voted in favor of Moldavian independence later that same month. Ultimately, parliament passed special laws to grant autonomous status for the region and incorporated a right to external self-determination within the national constitution. This successfully avoided armed conflict but also means many divisions remain unresolved.

These divisions were on display in February when Gagauzia held a referendum on the direction of the region. As Moldova prepares to enter into an Association Agreement with the EU, 98.4% of voters in Gagauzia voted in favor of the Russian-backed customs union while 98.9% voted for independence if Moldova joins the EU or gives up its sovereignty, for example by uniting with neighboring Romania. Despite their pro-Russian leanings, Gagauzia is generally less troublesome than Transnistria but the situation is lining up very similarly to the situation in Ukraine meaning that Gagauzia could wind up being the next domino to fall.

Abkhazia (Georgia) – This small region of Georgia on the Black Sea already enjoys de facto independence even though it is not recognized by most of the international community. Following the dissolution of the USSR, conflict broke out between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, ultimately ending in defeat for the Georgian military and the cleansing of most of the ethnic Georgian population through killings and mass displacement. While Abkhazia did not officially declare independence until 1999, the Georgian government in Tbilisi has not had control over the area since 1993.

Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu ultimately recognized Abkhazia’s official declaration of independence in the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The region remains heavily dependent on Russia for all trade. Russia also introduced new mechanisms for Abkhazians to gain Russian citizenship, which most inhabitants of the region now have. However despite these close ties, Abkhazia still finds itself largely sidelined by Russia as seen most recently during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.

South Ossetia (Georgia) – Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia first experience turmoil with Tbilisi in the lead up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The region which borders Russia first declared independence in 1991. A year of sporadic fighting between Ossentian and Georgian irregular fighters ended with an agreement on deployment of international peacekeepers to the region and recognized autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia. However, this ultimately was not enough and following the political shift towards the West after the 2003 Rose Revolution, Ossetians voted overwhelmingly in a regional referendum for full independence.

The referendum is not recognized by Georgia but fueled tensions between separatists and the government in Tbilisi. In 2008, the Georgian military launched a concerted land and air campaign to regain control of the region. As most Ossetians hold Russian passports, Russian responded with their own land and air campaigns, arguing such action was necessary to protect their citizens. Russian forces swept through Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a matter of days and started to occupy other regions of Georgia as well. Russia ultimately withdrew its troops back to the contested regions but complicated the situation by granting formal recognition to South Ossetia. Like Abkhazia, the euphoria over recognition did not last long as South Ossetia’s economy is now entirely dependent on an apathetic Russia and is largely ignored by politicians in Moscow.

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In all these cases, regions with sizable ethnic minority populations sought greater independence and self-determination in light of changing national policies, typically a greater move towards the West through closer ties with NATO and the EU over closer association with Russia. In each case, Russia has been more than happy to intervene, whether politically or militarily, to assure that does not happen. At times, such as in Eastern Ukraine or Crimea, this may be to assist ethnic Russians but in the other regions discussed here, the groups at issue are not ethnic Russian but are granted Russian passports that then serve as a pretext for intervention. It is a dangerous game of redrawing map borders through political manipulation and military deployment which already led to open conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and may lead to open conflict between Russia and Ukraine, currently the third largest country in Europe, if further meddling in the east continues.

Developments in Crimea also pose problems for Moldova who like Ukraine is finally about to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, will hold key parliamentary elections later this year and is still heavily reliant on Russia for trade and its natural gas supply. If Russia pursues Transnistria accession, it will create pockets of the Russian Federation with borders on Romania, Western Ukraine and Moldova, raising far more issues for more countries in the region.

It is also possible that these five regions are just the beginning. Belarus has thus far been a good partner to Russia but is also making moves for greater partnership and cooperation with NATO while Russia is already stating their concern over ethnic Russians in neighboring Estonia. But this is not just about potential Russian ambitions; setting the precedent of redrawing borders based on ethnic and citizen distribution but without political engagement with existing sovereign states could open doors for increased ethnic conflict and secession movements in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as Russia itself. In this light, Russia’s recent actions are far more than just a resurgence of Russian imperial ambitions but a potential Pandora’s Box that can have long lasting implications throughout Europe and Central Asia.

Originally published on UN Dispatch

In Russia, a Return to Bad Habits →

There was a brief moment in time, back in the early 1990s, where the idea of Russia becoming a real democracy did not seem ridiculous. By now, that illusion has passed. Corruption passes for governance, civil society functions albeit under strict scrutiny, and elections are less than free and fair. Needless to say dissent is not looked highly upon, so much so that earlier this year Russian officials declared a “rally” of “protesting” toys an illegal “unsanctioned public event.” The absurdity is good for a quick laugh, but actually just highlights the reasons why Freedom House found Russia to beconsolidated authoritarian regime in its Nations in Transit 2012 report.

There have been those who have fought against this slide. Numerous journalists have attempted to unveil the reality of the Russian government, with Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova probably being the best known and who were murdered in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Major protests broke outin December 2011 against Putin’s consolidation of power and the elections that cemented in power. But nothing has quite captured the same level of attention as Pussy Riot, a little known Russian punk performance group, before the Russian establishment declared war or them.

The cardinal sin in the Pussy Riot saga is a “punk prayer” they put on at Moscow’s Church of the Christ Savior. While the prayer only lasted about 40 seconds before they were thrown out, the real problem laid in the purpose of the performance which wasn’t made fully clear until an edited version – with an actual soundtrack – was released on YouTube. There, in an attempt to highlight the close relationship between the church and the state, the group sang a song calling upon the Virgin Mary to cast Putin out of office. Such an act of rebellion, albeit short and not really worth noticing, could not be ignored by the government. So of course three of the women involved were charged with hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.

In other words, their act of rebellion against the establishment constituted a hate crime in the eyes of the state.

To the outside world, the unfolding drama seemed a bit absurd. Inside Russia it is a little more complicated. Russia is a conservative country where feminism is not highly looked upon, and the Russian Orthodox Church currently enjoys a return to their close relationship with the government since the end of communism. The act itself was very offensive to many people who felt that it mocked the church, the faithful, as well as the government. But the question still remained what cost should be paid for merely being offensive.

This is where the Pussy Riot story actually took off. In most Western countries, a similar act may still constitute a crime (ie: trespassing, disturbing the peace, etc.), but a fine would be far more likely than jail time. But in Russia, the crime of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred carries a minimum prison sentence of two years and a maximum of seven. Is seven years an appropriate punishment for a 40 second stunt? Is two years? Does the act call for any punishment at all?

Answering these questions was the supposed purpose of the trial, but the trial itself was a charade. After being repeatedly denied bail and spending five months in prison, the trial of Maria Alyokhina, Yekaterina Samutsevich and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova opened and soon became a showcase of Orwellian justice. While the women were confined in a large glass prison cell, the defense was denied the right to present most of their evidence while the prosecution focused on the brightly colored dresses the women wore, their art from when they were in kindergarten, and the importance of Orthodox faith for the testifying witnesses. Even in Russia where politics routinely invade judicial proceedings, the Pussy Riot trial gave a new meaning to “show trial.”

The end result was Friday’s verdict: two years imprisonment. No one was surprised as it was clear from the beginning that the conviction was ensured. As international human rights groups, foreign governments and celebrities rushed to condemn the sentence, outside the courthouse pro-Pussy Riot protesters clashed with police and others who showed up to demonstrate solidarity with the Orthodox Church. While the womens’ legal team announced their intention to appeal the decision, no one harbors any illusions that the verdict or sentence will change.

This is big news this week but the group’s importance is larger than their own story. Without a doubt, the feminist punk angle and celebrity attention the women received created a good hook that Western media outlets happily exploited. Some observers have expressed discomfort with this exploitation, and more precisely the level of attention Pussy Riot has received over other victims of Putin’s Russia and the commercialization of the group’s image. That is a fair criticism, but ultimately misplaced. In the end the power of Pussy Riot isn’t in their punk art or their feminism, but rather in who and what they represent in Russian society. They are not alone in suffering the consequences of Russia’s slide back to authoritarianism. Journalists, artists, activists, civil society groups and many others brave enough to publically stand up for their rights and speak out against the government have suffered accordingly with financial ruin, imprisonment, torture, and even death. The sentiment behind the street protests of last December was a pushback against this growing siege mentality. But movements need faces and empathetic stories in order to get widespread recognition. I don’t know if it was Pussy Riot’s intention to give the world just that when they walked into the Church of the Christ Savior in February, but it was clear in the moving closing statements of Samutsevich and Alyokhina that they recognized this new role and spoke for more than just their own situation. For the first time in a long while, the world is paying attention to the state of human rights in Russia. And for Russia, like Pussy Riot, the verdict is not good.

Originally published on August 20, 2012 at www.foreignpolicyblogs.com