Why We Ought to Start Paying Attention to Burundi

Rarely does the small Central African country of Burundi get much international attention. However recent developments aimed at restricting political freedom ahead of scheduled national elections next year highlight not only the need for international attention, but greater international engagement if Burundi is to escape the cycle of civil wars and ethnic politics that has defined much of its history since independence.

Much like its northern neighbor Rwanda, Burundian politics have been shaped by ethnic divisions and the legacy of bad colonial policies since independence. However while in Rwanda the majority Hutu maintained power and control over the minority Tutsi, in Burundi the opposite took place with the minority Tutsi holding onto power through the military and oppressing the majority Hutu. Mass killing became common following independence in 1962 as Hutus and Tutsis alike attacked each other to gain a stronger foothold in national politics. By the time Burundi adopted a new constitution in 1992 that established a multiparty democratic system, an estimated 250,000 people had died. But rather than bring peace and stability to the country, the new constitution led to even more mass killings and a civil war that killed another 300,000 people before its drawn out end.

A series of peace talks led by African nations finally led to a set of agreements aimed at bringing Burundi out of civil war, disarming the various rebel groups and establishing a viable democratic government. The UN supported this effort with a peacekeeping operation until multiparty elections were held according to the new 2005 constitution. Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – the largest Hutu rebel group during the civil war and the ruling political party at the time of the 2005 constitutional referendum –  became president after being elected unopposed by parliament acting as an electoral college in an extraordinary election.

In becoming president, Nkurunziza inherited one of the poorest countries in the world with a war-weary population in need of desperate revival. While Burundi has made impressive strides in maintaining peace and has yet to return to civil war, Nkurunziza’s reign has still been marked with controversy that suggests all may not be well in the small country. In particular, the government has increasingly shown disdain for human rights and hostility towards civil society and the media. Several journalists and civil society leaders have been imprisoned in recent years for criticizing the government and raising objections to growing corruption while the government has also passed laws restricting freedom of the press and freedom on assembly.

In one of the more bizarre developments, last month the government banned jogging with other people in the capital of Bujumbura claiming that such jogging groups could be used to foment uprisings through unlicensed protest demonstrations. The city’s decision came after a court sentenced 21 opposition supporters to life imprisonment after police attempted to raid a jogging group they believed was being used as a front for political activity. Clashes ensued, more than 70 were arrested, and now all sporting activity in the capital is constricted by the government to 9 city parks that are closely monitored by authorities. This seemingly absurd development in a country with much larger problems than jogging groups is just one more sign of a shrinking public space and an increasingly paranoid executive.

But even as Nkurunziza’s paranoia about potential enemies increases, so does his quest for greater power. The 2005 constitution allows for two five-year terms as president; Nkurunziza’s second term will end next year in 2015. That has not stopped him from trying to force an interpretation of the constitution that would allow for a third term as his first election was by extraordinary vote in parliament and not by universal suffrage.  His attempts at this interpretation are concerning, but more distressing are the constitutional amendments he is trying to put in place in the meantime. Among the proposed changes are the abolishment of the two positions of vice president – which is held by one Hutu and one Tutsi for ethnic balance – in favor of a ceremonial vice president and a powerful prime minister. For parliament, Nkurunziza is proposing changing the mechanism for passing laws in parliament to require a simple majority instead of the current two-thirds supermajority and restricting parliamentary representation to only parties that gain at least 5% of the overall vote. All of these proposed changes threaten the delicate ethnic balance achieved in the 2005 constitution as it would almost inevitably push many Tutsis out of power and leave them unrepresented on the national level. Another proposed change would limit only those with university degrees from being able to run for president, coincidentally excluding some key opposition figures who are expected to run for election next year.

So far attempts to pass these amendments have failed; last month parliament failed to pass the revised constitution by just one vote shy of the four-fifths majority needed after the opposition boycotted the vote. But Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD’s insistence on these changes, now through a proposed popular referendum, is already alarming many groups inside and outside the country. Several civil society groups within Burundi are warning of what could come if political tempers do not calm down while the UN and the US have cautioned Burundi against taking actions that could stoke political violence. So far such warnings have fallen on deaf ears; last week the government expelled a UN official after the UN Office in Burundi released a report alleging the CNDD-FDD was arming its youth wing known as the Imbonerakure ahead of the elections. Despite denying the allegations, numerous civil society groups have noted an increase in political violence by the Imbonerakure, particularly against opposition supporters.

All of this portends difficult days ahead for Burundi. Constantly overshadowed by Rwanda, Burundi nonetheless has the ability to affect stability in a region where few crises stay within national borders. Yet it comes at a time when the international community is trying to disengage from the country. At the end of this year, the UN Office in Burundi is slated to be shut down, ending more than a decade of support for the country as it transitioned out of civil war. Recent events show that Burundi may not be ready for that and unless the international community takes a greater role in advancing reconciliation and political stability, a new civil war may not be that far off.

Originally appeared on UN Dispatch

A Big Vote for Tiny Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau holds the unfortunate distinction of never having a president complete a full five year term. That can change starting this weekend as the country holds its first election since a military coup in 2012. After a fair amount of domestic turmoil and delay, the elections offer the small West African country a chance at much needed political stability.

As the International Crisis Group points out elections are not occurring now due to a change in institutional strength or strong political will, but because Guinea-Bissau’s turbulent political climate led to most traditional donors and the IMF withdrawing from the country. While new donors and investors from China, Brazil and Angola have attempted to fill the void, the government is still on the verge of bankruptcy. A successful election is needed not only to transition back to democracy, but to also regain donor confidence for an essential cash injection. However even if the election is peaceful and all the candidates accept the results, inauguration of a new president represents only the first step towards putting the country on the right path.

One key element of Guinea-Bissau’s problems is the deep involvement of security forces in national politics. No president has yet to complete their five year constitutional term since the first multi-party elections were held in 1994. Limited periods of stability have come mainly through military dictatorship where the top leadership profited from turning the country into a hub in the South Atlantic drug and arms trafficking trade while ordinary citizens suffered from widespread human rights abuses and economic deprivation. Following the 2012 coup, Guinea-Bissau became Africa’s first narco-state as the entire drug trafficking infrastructure passed to the military as a means to consolidate their control over the political structure of the nation. Along the way, the military developed ties with numerous extremist groups in the region, including Al Qaeda affiliates, which threaten security not just in Guinea-Bissau but throughout West and Central Africa. Disentangling the military from the political scene as well as from the drug and arms trade is necessary for an actual democratic transition but it will not be easy to establish the rule of law and effective governance when it has been lacking for so long.

Yet despite the apparent obstacles, there are reasons to be optimistic. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which will be one of the international organizations to monitor the polls, has already highlighted the successful preparation for the election where an estimated 95% of eligible voters have registered to participate despite limited funding and infrastructure. So far there has been no indications of election-related violence in the lead up to the vote. Acting interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo is not standing in the election and has already said he would accept the results regardless of who is elected.

These are positive developments, but merely represent the first of many needed steps. And that is where the country is likely to run into trouble. Even as several international organizations and Western countries prepare to monitor the elections, there is little international interest in one of Africa’s smallest and poorest states. On a continent undergoing a major resource and land rush, the foundation of Guinea-Bissau’s legitimate economy – cashew and ground nuts – don’t have much international appeal. Even if Sunday’s election and the likely second-round presidential election occur without incident, Bissau-Guineans need strong support if they are to fully transition to an effective civilian government. As we have seen elsewhere, there is plenty of attention when elections come around but such attention usually wanes as soon as the results are declared. If Guinea-Bissau has any chance of breaking the cycle of instability that has seen two coups, an attempted coup, a civil war and a presidential assassination all in the last 20 years, sustained attention and assistance from the international community will be essential.

Originally published on UN Dispatch

Myanmar Census Confronted by Ethnic and Racial Tensions

Yesterday Myanmar started conducting its first national census in over 30 years. The census is an important exercise, one will give the government much needed information about the total population and demographics which it has lacked for three decades. But what should be an opportunity to move forward in the democratization process for the country is instead becoming yet another controversial development in the Myanmar’s bumpy transition out of international isolation.

Chief among concerns is the government’s overall approach to ethnicity in the census questionnaire. Not only does it ask very detailed questions about ethnicity and religion but as Elliott Prasse-Freeman pointed out late last year, it also forces a very diverse society to identify with just one ethnicity and group when Myanmar is far more of a melting pot of its 135 recognized ethnic groups. This proposes an absolute view of ethnicity that could further divide the country in light of growing ethnic and religious tensions. As with the collection of any type of personal information by the government, the major question is how it will be used by the government. It is unclear whether enough reform and democratization has occurred for people not to be concerned about the collection of incredibly detailed personal information, particularly about religion and ethnicity.

These general concerns don’t take into account the controversy surrounding treatment of Rohingya Muslims who under a 1982 law are not granted Myanma citizenship despite a long history in the country. Often referred to as one of the most marginalized groups in the world by the UN, the plight of the Rohingya has only worsened in recent years due to inter-communal violence with Buddhists that erupted in Rakhine State in 2012. Since then hundreds of Rohingya have been killed and an estimated 140,000 displaced in what Human Rights Watch has called a campaign of ethnic cleansing. As Myanmar continues to take promising steps towards democratization with successful parliamentary elections in 2012 and a planned general election in 2015, the issue of the Rohingya remains a difficult thorn in Myanmar’s new image.

The national census offers little to fix this. Initially there were hopes the Rohingya would be included in the census but significant pushback by the Buddhist community complicated those efforts. Even the rumor that Rohingya would be included led to a new campaign of sectarian marking, with people hanging Buddhist flags outside their homes to signify who is, and who is not, Buddhist. When a Western aid worker took down a flag from their office building last week, hundreds of Buddhists attacked the building and forced the government to put international aid workers under protective custody. This comes after the government banned Doctors Without Borders (MSF) from operating in Rakhine State due to what they called a “Rohingya bias” as MSF became the primary provider of medical care of the increasingly displaced population. With such tensions, the option of “Rohingya” has been left off the census in favor of the foreign “Bengali”, further signaling that things are unlikely to change and the Rohingya will remain stateless and marginalized for the foreseeable future.

How a country conducts its own census is largely a domestic issue but in this case the census is being implemented with the help and technical support of the UN. That means the UN is responsible for ensuring that such an exercise does not make a volatile situation worse. Given the inter-communal and sectarian violence that has wracked Rakhine state for the last two years and the ongoing ethnic tensions throughout the country that are deeply rooted in decades of strife, it makes little sense to risk the democratization process on an ill-timed and poorly thought out census. The International Crisis Group raised a plausible compromise where only the first six questions on the questionnaire – those dealing with age, sex and marital status – could be asked, successfully giving the government the information it needs to meet the development and governance needs of the people while also not unnecessarily stirring the pot with issues that need much more thought and planning. Obviously, such suggestions went unheeded. Thus while the census exercise will wrap up by April 10, the real concern is what impact it will have on an already fragile transitional state and its most vulnerable populations.

Originally published on UN Dispatch

The 5 Territories that Russia Could Annex Next

Following the recent referendum in Crimea and the growing tensions between the West and Russia over the latter’s military actions in Ukraine, many analysts are looking at what the secession may mean, not just for Ukraine but the region as a whole. One major question is whether Russia will stop at Crimea when it comes to welcoming former regions of the Soviet Union back into the fold. Russia’s past involvement in the region’s various secessionist movements may be helpful in understanding what could happen next, as well as highlight how recent developments reflect unfinished business from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Graphic courtesy of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Eastern Ukraine – Now that Crimea voted to join Russia, many analysts worry that the provinces of Eastern Ukraine with their significant ethnic Russian populations may be next. Like Crimea, most of the population of Eastern Ukraine reject the Euromaidan uprising that deposed President Viktor Yanukovych and favor closer ties with Russia over association with the EU. Recent attempts by the Ukrainian parliament to abolish the option of official regional languages for areas of the country with strong ethnic minorities, although ultimately vetoed by acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, spurred fears of ethnic Russians of oppression as Ukraine moves to the West. Local pro-Russian militias have already clashed with pro-Kiev groups in the eastern city of Donetsk, killing one and injuring dozens. The new government in Kiev seems at a loss about what to do as Russia adds fuel to the fire by mobilizing tank and artillery units along the border. As Ukraine prepares for new elections in May, Eastern Ukraine remains a potential hotspot for a far more volatile political conflict that could rip Ukraine apart.

Transnistria (Moldova) – Bordering Ukraine, this region of Moldova never wanted to leave the Soviet Union and suffered from rising ethnic tensions even before the USSR dissolved in 1991. Because of growing pro-Romanian nationalism in the rest of Moldova, Transnistria declared independence in 1990. As the USSR finally fell apart Transnistria became part of an independent Moldova and within months, open conflict broke out between Transnistria and the Moldovan government.

By July 1992, both sides agreed to a ceasefire and autonomous status for the region that has held to this day but also places Transnistria in limbo. Sporadic international negotiations over the last 15 years has resulted in no lasting agreement on the official rights or status of the region. A 2006 referendum received 97% vote in favor of joining with Russia, but the referendum is not recognized by the international community and has so far mainly been ignore by Russia. However, following recent events in Crimea, lawmakers in Transnistria are once again asking for accession.

Gagauzia (Moldova) – Like Transnistria, Gagauzia hold autonomous status within Moldova and shares a similar history in the wake of the breakup of the USSR. A regional referendum in 1991 heavily favored staying within the USSR, mainly due to concerns over the pro-Romanian nationalist movement. While Gagauzia unilaterally declared independence in August 1991, half of the representatives from the region still voted in favor of Moldavian independence later that same month. Ultimately, parliament passed special laws to grant autonomous status for the region and incorporated a right to external self-determination within the national constitution. This successfully avoided armed conflict but also means many divisions remain unresolved.

These divisions were on display in February when Gagauzia held a referendum on the direction of the region. As Moldova prepares to enter into an Association Agreement with the EU, 98.4% of voters in Gagauzia voted in favor of the Russian-backed customs union while 98.9% voted for independence if Moldova joins the EU or gives up its sovereignty, for example by uniting with neighboring Romania. Despite their pro-Russian leanings, Gagauzia is generally less troublesome than Transnistria but the situation is lining up very similarly to the situation in Ukraine meaning that Gagauzia could wind up being the next domino to fall.

Abkhazia (Georgia) – This small region of Georgia on the Black Sea already enjoys de facto independence even though it is not recognized by most of the international community. Following the dissolution of the USSR, conflict broke out between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, ultimately ending in defeat for the Georgian military and the cleansing of most of the ethnic Georgian population through killings and mass displacement. While Abkhazia did not officially declare independence until 1999, the Georgian government in Tbilisi has not had control over the area since 1993.

Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu ultimately recognized Abkhazia’s official declaration of independence in the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The region remains heavily dependent on Russia for all trade. Russia also introduced new mechanisms for Abkhazians to gain Russian citizenship, which most inhabitants of the region now have. However despite these close ties, Abkhazia still finds itself largely sidelined by Russia as seen most recently during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.

South Ossetia (Georgia) – Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia first experience turmoil with Tbilisi in the lead up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The region which borders Russia first declared independence in 1991. A year of sporadic fighting between Ossentian and Georgian irregular fighters ended with an agreement on deployment of international peacekeepers to the region and recognized autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia. However, this ultimately was not enough and following the political shift towards the West after the 2003 Rose Revolution, Ossetians voted overwhelmingly in a regional referendum for full independence.

The referendum is not recognized by Georgia but fueled tensions between separatists and the government in Tbilisi. In 2008, the Georgian military launched a concerted land and air campaign to regain control of the region. As most Ossetians hold Russian passports, Russian responded with their own land and air campaigns, arguing such action was necessary to protect their citizens. Russian forces swept through Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a matter of days and started to occupy other regions of Georgia as well. Russia ultimately withdrew its troops back to the contested regions but complicated the situation by granting formal recognition to South Ossetia. Like Abkhazia, the euphoria over recognition did not last long as South Ossetia’s economy is now entirely dependent on an apathetic Russia and is largely ignored by politicians in Moscow.

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In all these cases, regions with sizable ethnic minority populations sought greater independence and self-determination in light of changing national policies, typically a greater move towards the West through closer ties with NATO and the EU over closer association with Russia. In each case, Russia has been more than happy to intervene, whether politically or militarily, to assure that does not happen. At times, such as in Eastern Ukraine or Crimea, this may be to assist ethnic Russians but in the other regions discussed here, the groups at issue are not ethnic Russian but are granted Russian passports that then serve as a pretext for intervention. It is a dangerous game of redrawing map borders through political manipulation and military deployment which already led to open conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and may lead to open conflict between Russia and Ukraine, currently the third largest country in Europe, if further meddling in the east continues.

Developments in Crimea also pose problems for Moldova who like Ukraine is finally about to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, will hold key parliamentary elections later this year and is still heavily reliant on Russia for trade and its natural gas supply. If Russia pursues Transnistria accession, it will create pockets of the Russian Federation with borders on Romania, Western Ukraine and Moldova, raising far more issues for more countries in the region.

It is also possible that these five regions are just the beginning. Belarus has thus far been a good partner to Russia but is also making moves for greater partnership and cooperation with NATO while Russia is already stating their concern over ethnic Russians in neighboring Estonia. But this is not just about potential Russian ambitions; setting the precedent of redrawing borders based on ethnic and citizen distribution but without political engagement with existing sovereign states could open doors for increased ethnic conflict and secession movements in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as Russia itself. In this light, Russia’s recent actions are far more than just a resurgence of Russian imperial ambitions but a potential Pandora’s Box that can have long lasting implications throughout Europe and Central Asia.

Originally published on UN Dispatch

Human Rights Wonks Discuss "The Act of Killing"

[The following was posted on UN Dispatch by Mark Leon Goldberg ahead of the Academy Awards on March 2. The Act of Killing is available on Netflix as well as for download on iTunes and the film's official US website.]

The Act of Killing, which is up for an Oscar on Sunday for Best Documentary, is a seriously confounding film. The films’ protagonists were part of a murderous frenzy in 1965 that lead to the killing of at least 1 million suspected “communists” and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.  The Act of Killing depicts old members of a death squad acting out their memories — fantasies even —  of the murders and atrocities they committed nearly 50 years ago.  If you are a reader of UN Dispatch or just generally care about human rights you need to see this documentary.

The Act of Killing raises profound questions about international human rights law, accountability, historical memory, and even the role of sadism in mass atrocity events. The film left me perplexed, so I invited some of the smartest human rights wonks around to help think through some of these questions.

Here to discuss the film with me are:

Rebecca Hamilton, human rights lawyer, journalist and author of Fighting for Darfur. She teaches at Columbia Law School and tweets @bechamilton

Kate Cronin-Furman, lawyer and political scientist who researches accountability for mass atrocities. She blogs at wrongingrights.com

Daniel Solomon, a writer and consultant based in Washington, DC. He blogs at Securing Rights, and is a former national director of STAND, a national student network of student advocates for mass atrocity prevention.

Kevin Jon Heller, Professor of Criminal Law, SOAS, University of London Principal Fellow, Melbourne Law School. He blogs at opiniojuris.org

Kimberly Curtis, Lawyer and UN Dispatch contributor. 

Mark Leon Goldberg: Let’s kick this off! First, a legal question that has been bugging me: Do you think the film reveals evidence of genocide? To be sure, most of those murdered were killed because they were deemed to be “communists” and not because of their ethnicity. But the protagonists of the documentary–Anwar Congo and his death squad — also boast about hunting down ethnic Chinese Indonesians. The death squad’s logic seemed to be that ethnic Chinese must, ipso facto, be “communists.”

I’m no lawyer, but that reeks of genocidal intent to me.  

Rebecca Hamilton: It’s a similar classification challenge to Cambodia. While many of us believe “political group” should have been included in the Genocide Convention, we are stuck with the Convention we’ve got – “communists” are not a protected group. And what I couldn’t tell from the film was whether there was an intent to destroy ethnic Chinese Indonesians as such, or whether ethnicity just served as a convenient proxy for the target group of “communists” (actual or perceived).

But in many ways the answer to this question is less important that what is crystal clear – the commission of crimes against humanity by perpetrators who are living out their lives with total impunity. For me, “The Act of Killing” is a 2-hour long rebuttal to Mbeki and Mamdani’s recent NYT op ed. While I agreed with aspects of their editorial, this documentary is a chilling insight into what society you can end up with when there has been no accountability.

Kimberly Curtis: I largely agree with Rebecca. Genocide has a certain dramatic appeal but we need to keep in mind that it is a specific act with a specific definition and targeting people based on their political affiliation doesn’t fit. While some acts described in the film make clear some of the violence was ethnically based, it is also clear the primary marker of a victim was their alleged involvement with the PKI. It is clear that gross human rights abuses and crimes against humanity occurred here. Just because it doesn’t fall under the genocide label doesn’t mean that these crimes are any less severe.

Daniel Solomon: On the one hand, I sympathize with Bec and Kimberly’s respective takes. Within the strict confines of the Genocide Convention–that is, a legal definition of the event–the atrocities of Sukarno’s “death squads” don’t quite fit. Beyond the Convention, “genocide” has become a term of anthropological reference for a much broader swath of identity-motivated violence–in Anwar Congo’s era, and since. In the Indonesian society that Oppenheimer’s documentary recalls, a victim’s identity is neither exclusively “political” nor exclusively “ethnic”–as Mark suggests, the two identity markets blend and interact, often as a consequence of perpetrators like Congo’s militia.

(As a sidenote, that’s one of the challenging facets of the film: in a movie about perpetrators, the agency of victims and survivors in defining their own identities amid violence is difficult to find.)

Mark Leon Goldberg: Genocide or not, we know crimes against humanity were committed–the protagonists gleefully admitted as much. What avenues exist for bringing these people to justice, if any? The ICC is out of the question because it cannot prosecute crimes before 2002. Presumably, the Indonesian justice system should pursue the case, but there does not seem to be much willingness to do so.  So what can be done?

Kevin Jon Heller:  Just to make myself quickly and effectively unpopular: I seriously doubt the acts in question even qualify as crimes against humanity (CAH) — at least legally. WW II-era jurisprudence was quite clear that CAH required a nexus to war crimes or crimes against peace; purely “peacetime” acts might be criminal under domestic law, but they did not offend international law. I don’t think there is a serious argument that the nexus had been eliminated from the definition of CAH by 1965. The [Cambodian War Crimes Tribunal] concluded in Case No 001 that the nexus no longer existed as of 1975, based on one paragraph in an expert report commissioned by the UN. Even that conclusion was questionable, but at least the experts could point to the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, which did not contain the nexus. But note the date — 1968, after the events in question in Indonesia. So, too, the 1973 Apartheid Convention, which also removed the nexus.

This is, in my view, a major problem for accountability. I don’t think the Indonesian killings could be described as war crimes — even if the coup itself created an armed conflict (doubtful), it was over before the purges started — so I don’t see how they qualify as international crimes at all. Which means, unfortunately, that the only possible accountability mechanism, universal jurisdiction, is off the table.

The bottom line, then, seems to be that only Indonesia itself could prosecute the events in 1965 and 1966.

I will, of course, not hold my breath.

Rebecca Hamilton: Ever the optimist when it comes to justice eventually having its day, I’d like to at least say it’s arguable. I missed that the killings were complete by 1966 when I watched the film (and I went in with such an appalling dearth of knowledge of Indonesian history that it wasn’t part of my general knowledge to begin with), but that being the case Kevin’s right it would be much clearer if it was after the 1968 Convention.

Presumably an aggressive prosecutor might try to argue that since the ILC’s 1954 Draft Code already eliminated the nexus, the Convention merely solidified an already existing trend against it. Honestly, I think that’s a stretch given states’ reactions even in 1968 to the Convention. (For legal nerds reading this, check out Stuart Ford’s paper on when the nexus was eliminated in relation to the ECCC, or if you want to go deeper, Ch. 10 of Kevin’s book on the origins of ICL).

Alternatively, and having now looked a little beyond the film, it seems that there are reports of at least some counts of political persecution and murders of perceived communists, including those imprisoned, in 1969. I say this again with the caveat that I have little pre-existing knowledge about this period of Indonesia’s history, but to the extent such killings can be still be documented, and involved similar power structures to the 1965-66 campaign, that could be another way of securing some form of accountability, even while failing to prosecute the primary killings.

Still, in light of the difficulties – and the implications that these cases could open up for the complicity of Western powers, even at just a moral level – it’s hard to see a universal jurisdiction case ever seeing the light of day. And as Mark points out, the ICC is decades out of the running for jurisdiction. Thus we end up at the same bleak conclusion: Indonesia itself is the forum for accountability – and a highly unlikely one at that.

Kimberly Curtis: Even if the legal issues were resolved there are still significant practical and political barriers to any type of traditional accountability. The ICC is not an option but the establishment of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal is also unlikely due to the experience in Cambodia with the [War Crimes Tribunal, known as the ECCC]. Many of the same elements exist here as with Cambodia, including dealing with crimes that happened far in the past, a government that is related to or connected with those crimes and a culture of corruption in the countries at issue. The ECCC has been incredibly expensive with very few outcomes and a constant battle for the UN and donor states. I don’t think anyone is too keen to repeat that experiment.

That means any action would have to be undertaken by Indonesia itself. I am not familiar enough with the Indonesia legal code to know if that is even possible, but assuming it is there are still significant barriers. We are talking about crimes that happened nearly 50 years ago. Those who bear the most responsibility are probably already dead or very close to it, witness testimony after 50 years would likely have credibility issues, as would any physical evidence. And in the end, the film showed just how much power and influence many of these people still hold today. Again, I don’t think anyone in Indonesia is too keen to give up that power in order to prosecute themselves.

With judicial accountability off the table, a truth and reconciliation commission could be an option but it too would face many of the same problems that a domestic prosecution would. From what I understand, this chapter in Indonesian history is not really taught in schools and not really talked about openly in society, at least regarding the level and brutality of the killings. After 50 years, I’m not sure there is enough motivation in general society to get a well-funded and mandated TRC up and running. So in the end, I am pessimistic on the likelihood that any of these people will be held accountable for the acts they committed.

Daniel Solomon:  I am not confident of Indonesia’s prospects for formal justice and accountability, at least in the criminal sense. International judicial mechanisms–an ad-hoc tribunal, given the ICC’s mandated absence–are unlikely, and so the burden returns to Indonesia’s domestic courts. One might extrapolate from the recent foibles of Guatemala’s Rios Montt case: thirty years after the atrocity occurred, domestic prosecutors wage a heroic accountability effort, only to be thwarted by the messy politics of the country’s legal bureaucracy. Given the overlap, which Kimberly mentioned, between Sukarno’s beneficiaries and Indonesia’s present elites, full accountability appears elusive.

Mark Leon Goldberg: One issue that this film raises is the role of sadism in committing mass atrocities.  I realize now that prior to watching this film, I had generally thought of perpetrators of mass atrocities as faceless automatons, acting under orders of some higher authority to kill sufficiently dehumanized the victims. Grisly as it was, to individual Interhamwe/Nazis/Janjaweed, they were just doing a job.

It never occurred to me that perpetrators of mass atrocities may actually take pleasure from their acts, as Anwar Congo’s death squad seemed to do. Do you think sadism is a necessary condition for committing mass atrocities? Do political leaders like Slobodan Milosevic or Omar al- Bashir depend on the fact that some percentage of foot soldiers in their ranks are sadists? 

Kate Cronin-Furman:  One of the things that struck me about the film was the depiction of how a real range of psychological types reacted to involvement in extraordinary violence. While Ady comes across as a true sociopath with no remorse, Anwar, despite his initially cold-blooded presentation, is clearly capable of empathy. Watching him suffer as he began to revisit his actions was almost more disturbing than hearing Ady chuckle as he described killing his girlfriend’s father. It shows that under the right circumstances, “normal” people are capable not only of distancing themselves from their fellow humans sufficiently to slaughter them under orders, but can actually take pride and even joy in the work.

Relatedly, it was amazing to me that the person who actually comes off worst was not the man making a movie glorifying the 1,000 murders he’d committed, or the one who insisted he had nothing to feel guilty over; it was the journalist who, nearly a half century later, insisted that he hadn’t noticed the torture going on in the office next door.

Rebecca Hamilton:  That journalist! I had such a conflicted reaction to him. Outrage over the bald-faced denial, but also a feeling of, here finally is someone who at some level must understand that what happened was actually wrong, otherwise why pretend you didn’t know about it? Until the point in the film when Anwar begins to develop some insight into what his actions meant for his victims, it was such a surreal experience for the viewer to enter a universe in which there seemed to be no recognition of wrongfulness whatsoever. Even in the rare instance of hearing from one of the victims – and this was the most heartbreaking moment in the film for me – there was a painful effort by him to cast the recollection of his step-father’s kidnapping and murder as merely useful material for a film that glorified necessary actions.

On Mark’s question more directly, the striking thing to me in listening to the perpetrators was the absence of ideological motivation – and in its place the role for sadism and the bizarre meshing of Hollywood fiction and reality. Other perpetrators I’ve spoken with directly, the most notorious being Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, seem to consistently emphasize the “threat” the target group posed. Now perhaps that is just an act of self-justification and/or a product of a situation where accountability is still very much a risk for them – I’m not sure. If Ady and Anwar really thought they might one day be prosecuted, might they have de-emphasized the role of sadism and instead portrayed themselves as part of a struggle for survival against the “threat” of Communism?

Kate Cronin-Furman: The story of the step-father’s killing stuck with me as well. It so painfully underscored what it means to be member of a society with no accountability for acts of mass atrocity. To live side by side with those who have committed terrible crimes against you, to see every day the man who tortured your father, raped your sister, or murdered your child.

And because impunity is the rule, rather than the exception, this is the reality for huge numbers of people around the world. I must use the phrase “right to justice” at least once a day, but watching that poor man struggle to tell his story of victimization in a way that would interest the perpetrators really drove home what it means to be deprived of that right.

Mark Leon Goldberg: The most insane scene to me was the TV talk show in which a young host, probably in her mid 20s, lavished effusive praise for Congo’s murderous conduct 50 years ago. For comparison’s sake:  We’d would never see a popular German TV host in 1990 cheer on an SS officer for his exploits during the war. German society has learned to accept responsibility for the Holocaust, which has been engrained in subsequent generations through education and politics. 

I wonder to what extent the general lack of remorse and lack of self-reflection by both the individual perpetrators and society-at-large is a consequence of the fact that the people and political parties who benefited from this campaign of violence are still very much in charge? 

Kimberly Curtis: The talk show scene did not really surprise me as it matches the other information in the film regarding how open these acts were committed and the impunity they enjoyed since. Generally this does not seem to be considered a dark chapter of Indonesia’s history, so why would there be any need to try and sugarcoat it, especially in front of an audience of fatigue wearing Pancasila Youth? This makes it different from the example of Nazi Germany where by virtue of Allied occupation, Germans were not given the choice of whether or not they wanted to hold regime accountable. That led to a culture of accountability that does not exist in Indonesia.

What was more telling about that scene was the reaction of the technicians watching the interview. Away from the audience and perpetrators, the picture the technicians painted in their opinions of the former killers was far from positive. From ruminating about the mental impact of the killings on the killers to their corruption since, it gave a much more honest view of how many in the community probably view them, which is far from the glory that the other characters in the film frame their actions.

For what it’s worth, [director] Joshua Oppenheimer wrote a piece in The Guardian recently that outlined the genesis of the film (it originally focused on survivors) as well as the reaction to it in Indonesia. It appears the film has finally broken the wall of silence that generally surrounded the killings. While Indonesia still has a long way to go in terms of accountability and reconciliation, for the first time these things are actually being discussed by the government and the community. It is a step in the right direction even if it is long overdue.

Daniel Solomon: I’d be remiss if I didn’t raise the final scene, in which Oppenheimer captures Anwar Congo’s literally sickening collapse–the scene, I think, underscores both the complexity of the perpetrators’ sadism, as Mark referenced, and the justice gap that Kate and Kimberly have described. In the scene, Congo retches into the trough in the rooftop-prison, where the militia would torture and kill its captives, in between descriptions of their atrocious acts. Congo’s monologue suggests the empathy that Kate referenced–remorse, or at the very least internal suffering, is possible. This emotion betrays the allegedly total sadism of the militia’s perpetrators, but the outcome is the same: at the end of the monologue, he returns downstairs, to the society that won’t punish him for his crimes. I was left wondering what justice, in the formal sense, would mean for the perpetrators of the militia’s crimes, in addition to their victims. Would Congo’s imperfect remorse look different from the inside of a jail cell?

Robert Mugabe Turns 90

Robert Mugabe, the longstanding president of Zimbabwe, celebrates his 90th birthday today. There is no question he has seen significant changes occur over his lifetime, from the end of colonialism to the rise of globalization. But being the only president Zimbabwe has ever had since its transition to majority rule in 1980 also means that no other person has defined the political and economic landscape of his country more than he has.

Looking at the state of Zimbabwe today, that is neither a positive legacy nor one that many in Zimbabwe hope continues.

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Why Bosnians Are Protesting

Nearly two decades after the Dayton Peace Accords ended the Bosnian Civil War, Bosnia is back in international headlines after three days of violent protests engulfed the country last week. What started as a peaceful protest against the privatization and closure of state industries in Tuzla on February 4 soon turned violent as protesters clashed with police the following day. Protests held both in solidarity with Tuzla and against local politicians spread to Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica and Bihac on February 6 where the growing crowds continued to clash with police. By the fourth day of protests, people gathered in every major city in the country with rioting breaking out in several, leading to hundreds hurt.

In many ways, understanding last week’s protests starts with understanding the system the Dayton Accords put in place in 1995. While the agreement ended the war, it also set up a fractured government with the establishment of two autonomous regions – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS) – which are further divided into local political units. A third semi-autonomous region, Brčko, was formed in 2000 and is ruled by a local government but is located both within the Federation and the RS. The Accords also set up a limited national government headed by a three-person presidency and a proportionally divided parliament based on the country’s three major ethnic groups. In other words, “the most over-governed country in the world” is a bureaucratic nightmare. This system established by the Accords has successfully maintained peace but also encourages a bloated and corrupt civil service, ethnically based politics and a lot of political infighting.

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